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In 2006, Texas faced a fiscal double whammy. Not only 
had the Texas Supreme Court ordered the state to pick up 
more of the tab for K-12 education, but the legislature 
promised voters significant property tax relief. To achieve 
both goals simultaneously, the Texas Legislature 
expanded the state’s franchise tax (a form of corporate 
income tax) to include businesses other than corporations. 
A good idea in principle, but not in execution.  
The Texas franchise tax is a 
business tax levied on a 
firm’s “taxable margin.” It 
applies to most Texas busi-
nesses, although very small 
firms (those with revenues 
less than $1.11 million per 
year), sole proprietorships, 
and general partnerships of 
natural persons (i.e., human 
beings) are tax exempt. 
A key feature of the Texas 
franchise tax is that busi-
nesses choose how they are 
taxed. The three tax options 
are: 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
The Texas franchise tax burdens 
taxpayers without generating 
sufficient tax revenue.  
 
The tax is particularly hostile to 
smaller businesses and the 
business services industry. 
 
Revenue would be better raised 
by replacing the franchise tax 
with either a value added tax 
(VAT) or a broader sales tax 
that includes consumer 
services.  
 
2 1. Cost of Goods Sold- Firms are taxed on 
the difference between total revenue and 
the Texas definition of their cost of goods 
sold (COGS). The Texas COGS includes all 
expenses related to the acquisition and 
production of tangible property. Howev-
er, expenses related to the distribution or 
sale of such property are not considered 
part of COGS. For example, the labor of a 
cook is part of a Texas restaurant’s COGS, 
but the labor of a waitress is not. Expens-
es related to the production of intangi-
bles (such as services) and the compen-
sation of corporate officers are also not 
deductible.  
2. Compensation margin- Firms are taxed 
on the difference between total revenue 
and total labor compensation. There is a 
$360,000 per person cap on the amount 
of compensation that can be subtracted.  
3. Gross Receipts- Firms are taxed on 70% 
of their total revenue, which is equivalent 
to deducting expenses equal to 30% of 
total revenue. Firms with less than $20 
million in annual revenues can choose 
the EZ Computation version of this op-
tion, which is equivalent to deducting 
expenses equal to 55.9% of total reve-
nues.1 All firms (except those that choose 
the EZ Computation option) are allowed 
a minimum deduction of $1 million.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, the 188,231 Texas 
firms filing for the franchise tax in 2015 
chose the COGS option (which typically pro-
vides manufacturing firms the largest deduc-
tion possible) slightly more often than the 
gross receipts option (which includes the EZ 
Computation and the $1 million minimum 
deduction).  Only 15% of filers chose to pay 
tax on their compensation margin.  
THE FRANCHISE TAX FALLS SHORT 
The key to understanding the flaws in the 
franchise tax is recognizing that—with a few 
notable exceptions—Texas firms are highly 
mobile. As a result, taxes that would other-
wise fall on businesses are passed along to 
workers, customers, and landlords. Firms 
unable to pass on the excess costs of doing 
business in Texas will close up shop or move 
on down the road to another, friendlier state.  
Allowing businesses to choose their tax base 
sounds business friendly, but it is not—
because all of the choices are bad. In each 
case, firms pay a tax on their profits plus 
their non-deductible expenses, meaning that 
firms can owe tax even when they are losing 
money. Firms with a larger share of expenses 
that are not deductible pay higher effective 
tax rates than other firms, which distorts 
business decision-making and favors some 
industries over others. 
Firms choosing option 1 are taxed on their 
profits, their costs of producing intangibles, 
their costs for distribution and sales, and 
some payroll. This option disproportionately 



































































Source: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 
distribute their products, and discourages 
the purchase of many business services, like 
those related to sales and advertising. 
Firms choosing option 2 are taxed on their 
profits, their non-payroll costs of doing busi-
ness, like rent or electricity, and some pay-
roll. Firms producing services, such as air-
lines or accounting firms, tend to choose this 
option because they don’t produce tangible 
property (so option 1 is off the table) and 
their labor costs exceed 30% of their reve-
nues (so option 3 is less attractive). Under 
this option, employee labor is deductible but 
purchased services are not, so firms that em-
ploy accountants, lawyers, or computer pro-
grammers pay lower taxes than firms that 
hire accounting firms (or law firms, or free-
lancers), which again discourages the pur-
chase of business services. So, even if a firm 
is too small to pay the franchise tax itself, it 
still can be adversely affected if it loses busi-
ness because its customers decide, for tax 
reasons, to provide such services in-house. 
Firms choosing option 3 are taxed on their 
gross receipts. This approach to taxation is 
particularly distortionary because every time 
a product changes hands, the entire value of 
the product is taxed. Consider, for example, a 
restaurant. It buys eggs from a local farmer, 
and a gross receipts tax is collected. When it 
sells omelets to a hungry crowd the gross 
receipts tax is collected again. The full value 
of the eggs is taxed twice, once at the farm 
level and again at the restaurant level. If the 
farmer had sold those eggs to a wholesaler 
rather than directly to the restaurant, the 
eggs would have been taxed three times. This 
“tax cascading” aspect of a gross receipts tax 
means that the effective tax rate can be many 
times higher than the statutory tax rate, com-
pounding the distortionary effect of the tax. 
Tax cascading also means the effective tax 
rate depends on the number of times a prod-
uct changes hands. Large, vertically integrat-
ed firms can complete all steps of the produc-
tion process in-house and do not incur taxes 
until they sell their product to the final con-
sumer. Smaller businesses create a taxable 
event every time they buy or sell, leading to 
higher effective tax rates on products pro-
duced by a series of smaller businesses than 
on products produced by a single, large firm. 
Simply put, a gross receipts tax is biased 
against smaller businesses. 
Economists evaluate the efficiency of a tax 
based on the economic distortion per dollar 
of revenue. By this criteria, the franchise tax 
is especially inefficient because it distorts 
firm behavior without raising enough reve-
nue. Figure 2 depicts the estimated revenue 
projections of the franchise tax alongside the 
actual revenue raised since 2007. It shows 
that the state has received 25% less in tax 
revenue than was originally projected when 
the law was passed. The shortfalls were clear 
almost immediately with $2 billion less than 
expected being raised annually. 
In May 2015, the Texas Legislature passed an 
across the board 25% cut to the franchise tax 
rate. Beginning in 2016, the tax rate was re-
duced to 0.75%, saving taxpayers roughly 



























































Simply put, a gross receipts 
tax is biased against smaller 
businesses 
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Notes: 
For more information on the Texas franchise tax, see: 
 Texas Taxpayers and Research Association (2011, October). 
Understanding the Texas franchise-or “margins”-tax. Retrieved from 
http://www.ttara.org/files/document/file-4ea5bda9239ef.pdf  
 Seay, M. & Martens. J. (2010, Mar/Apr). A few quick answers about the 
Texas franchise (margin) tax. Journal of State Taxation, 28(3), 29-34.  
 Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. http://comptroller.texas.gov/
taxinfo/franchise/ 
1 Businesses that choose the EZ Computation pay a tax rate of 0.331% on 
100% of their revenues rather than 0.75% on 70% of their revenues. A 
firm with $10 million in revenues would pay $33,100 under the EZ 
option. It would also pay $33,100 under the gross receipts option if it 
paid 0.75% on 44.1% of its revenues, implying a deduction of 55.9% . 
2 The franchise tax rate for firms primarily engaged in wholesale and 
retail trade, which is half the rate for other firms, was cut to 0.375%.  
3 Texas Legislative Guide, Budget & Taxes. (2015, May). Cutting margins 
taxes. Retrieved from http://txlege.texastribune.org/topics/budget-and-
taxes/cutting-margins-taxes/ 
4 Gruber, J. (2012) Public Finance and Public Policy , fourth edition. 





The franchise tax is inefficient due to its low 
revenue and distortionary effects. It is inequi-
table as it favors some industries over others 
and large firms over smaller businesses. The 
tax has also failed to meet predicted revenue 
estimates or adequately fund public educa-
tion.  
Replacing the franchise tax either with a value 
added tax (VAT) that taxes all businesses on 
the difference between their revenues and the 
total amounts they paid for inputs from other 
firms4 or with a broader sales tax that in-
cludes consumer services—as was discussed 
in a previous Takeaway5—would be a more 
feasible, efficient, and equitable way to raise 
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To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 









































Figure 2: Actual and Estimated Revenue Raised 
by the Franchise Tax  
Source: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 
